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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANKRUPTCY 
GENERAL 
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor had purchased 54 cows 
from the plaintiff in exchange for a promissory note and security 
interest. Although the seller’s purchase-money security interest 
in the cows was not entitled to priority over a bank’s prior-
perfected security interest (see case summary under Secured 
Transactions infra), the seller sought either relief from the 
automatic stay or adequate protection payments for the seller’s 
interest in the cows still owned by the debtor. The court held 
that the seller had the burden of proof that the cows were 
declining in value and that the seller had failed to provide 
evidence that the cows were declining in value. There was some 
evidence that the cows were worth less at the start of the 
bankruptcy case but the court noted a lack of evidence that the 
value had dropped since the beginning of the case. Zink v. 
Vanmiddlesworth, 300 B.R. 394 (N.D. N.Y. 2003). 
CONTRACTS 
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. The plaintiff was a 
farm equipment sales company which purchased and sold new, 
used and salvaged farm equipment. The plaintiff agreed to sell 
to the defendant the equipment parts portion of the business. 
The sales agreement contained a covenant not to compete which 
did not define the terms “salvage” and “attachments” which 
led to disagreements between the parties as to the types of farm 
equipment the plaintiff could continue to sell. The trial court 
ruled that the parties had not had a meeting of the minds as to 
the covenant not to compete clause and ordered the clause 
stricken from the contract and the purchase price reduced by 
the value of the covenant. The appellate court reversed, holding 
that the trial court went too far in that the meeting of the minds 
doctrine as applied here would void a contract whenever the 
parties disagreed about the contract terms. The court noted that 
the sales agreement had several manifestations of intent to 
contract between the parties; therefore, there was a meeting of 
the minds to make a contract. The court remanded the case for 
the trial court’s construction of the disputed clause based on 
the evidence presented. Don King Equipment Co. v. Double 
D Tractor Parts, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
TORT CLAIMS. The plaintiffs were hog farmers who 
purchased plastic slat flooring from one defendant which was 
manufactured by the other defendants. The floors were designed 
to allow the waste products to fall below the flooring and not 
contaminate the living spaces. The promotional materials for 
the flooring claimed a ten-year warranty but the sales contracts 
provided for a warranty of “only for one (1) year from the date 
of substantial completion or for such period as the 
manufacturer’s warranty, whichever is less.” Four years after 
installation, the flooring was unable to handle the corrosive 
effect of the hog waste, the flooring buckled, and the hogs tore 
up the plastic slats and fell through the floor, resulting in the 
loss of around 50 hogs. The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, 
breach of implied and express warranties, negligent design and 
negligent misrepresentation. The plaintiffs sought replacement-
cost damages, business-interruption damages, and other 
expenses. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims on the 
grounds that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, 
the parol-evidence rule, and the economic-loss doctrine. The 
trial court dismissed the breach of contract claims because the 
sales contract had a one year warranty which had expired by 
the time the suit was filed. The appellate court agreed, noting 
that the sales contract warranty clause specifically stated that 
the plaintiffs’ placement of hogs in the building constituted an 
acceptance of the flooring “as is.” However, the court held that 
the one year warranty clause did not apply to the defendant 
manufacturers because they were not a party to the contract. 
Some of the sales contracts were governed by Iowa law and 
some were governed by North Carolina law. The court held that 
under the laws of both states, no tort actions could be brought 
for economic damages. However, as to the defendant 
manufacturers, Minnesota, the forum where the hog floors were 
located, law applied. Under Minnesota law, a consumer may 
bring a tort action for economic damages. The court held that 
the hog farmers were not merchants of flooring and were 
consumers. The court noted that the Minnesota legislature had 
changed this law after the events of this case. Holden Farms, 
Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc., 347 F.3d 1055 (8th Cir. 2003). 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
KARNAL BUNT. The APHIS has issued interim regulations 
adding areas of Arizona to the list of regulated areas and 
removing areas in Riverside, CA from the list of regulated areas. 
69 Fed. Reg. 245 (Jan. 5, 2004). 
MEAT INSPECTION. The debtor was a meat processor with 
contracts to provide ground beef for the National School Lunch 
Program. The FSIS performed tests at the debtor’s plant to 
determine whether the debtor’s products contained Salmonella 
as a means of determining whether the debtor’s Pathogen 
Reduction/Hazard Analysis and Critical Points (HAACP) 
system was effective. The debtor’s plant failed three separate 
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tests and the FSIS suspended inspection activities at the 
debtor’s plant, effectively preventing any sale of the debtor’s 
products. The USDA also terminated the School Lunch 
contract. The debtor filed suit against the USDA, alleging 
that the USDA had overstepped its authority in creating the 
Salmonella tests and seeking a temporary restraining order 
enjoining FSIS from removing its inspectors. The debtor 
won a favorable ruling as to the FSIS inspection tests but the 
trial court held that the USDA could terminate the contracts. 
Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 
113 F. Supp.2d 1048 (N.D. Tex. 2000), aff’d, 275 F.3d 432 
(5th Cir. 2001). The USDA also terminated the School Lunch 
contract. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and the USDA filed 
claims for services provided to the debtor. The bankruptcy 
trustee filed a complaint against the USDA for : (1) tortious 
interference with prospective business relations; (2) tortious 
interference with existing contracts; (3) slander; (4) business 
disparagement; and (5) breach of duty to perform proper 
inspection. The court held that the claims were not allowed 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act because the USDA 
implementation of the Salmonella regulations was a 
discretionary act which did not waive the USDA sovereign 
immunity from suit. Zayler v. United States, 279 F. Supp.2d 
805 (E.D. Tex. 2003). 
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
ACT. The plaintiffs were sellers of agricultural commodities 
to a merchant who failed to pay for the produce but used PACA 
trust funds to pay on a loan from the defendant bank. The 
plaintiffs argued that the bank was liable for the merchant’s 
breach of the PACA trust. The defendant argued that the 
plaintiffs failed to preserve their rights in the PACA trust and 
that the defendant was not liable for the merchant’s breach  of 
the PACA trust duties because the defendant did not know 
about the breach. The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs 
did not mail notification of their intent to preserve their PACA 
trust rights to the merchant. On the first issue, the court noted 
that, under New York law, proof of mailing can be made by 
evidence of standard office procedures. The plaintiffs provided 
testimony of their office procedures, the mailing of the notices 
to the merchant on a routine basis, and certified copies of the 
same notices sent to the USDA. In addition, the court noted 
that the merchant did not deny ever receiving the notices. The 
court held that the plaintiffs did provide a PACA trust notice 
to the merchant and USDA. Some plaintiffs provided only 
certified copies of their notices to the USDA and the court 
held that they failed to prove that they provided notices to the 
merchant, thus losing their PACA trust rights. On the second 
issue, the court noted that the merchant had a cash-flow 
problem which was known by the defendant because the 
merchant had applied for an overdraft protection line-of-credit 
and continuously and excessively exceeded the credit limit 
on this account. The defendant took steps to reduce the 
merchant’s debts to the defendant and threatened to close the 
merchant’s account if the loan amounts were not reduced. The 
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court held that the defendant did not take the steps of a 
reasonably prudent lender in failing to investigate whether the 
merchant was meeting the fiduciary obligation to the PACA 
trust. The court held that the defendant lender was liable for 
the PACA trust funds paid to the defendant by the merchant. 
Because most of the funds paid to the defendant were reloaned 
to the merchant for payment of more produce, the damages 
were limited to the payments made to other, non-PACA 
suppliers and creditors. Albee Tomato Co., Inc. v. Korea 
Commercial Bank of New York, 282 F. Supp.2d 6 (S.D. N.Y. 
2003). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS DEDUCTION. The 
decedent’s estate included interests in a business. The executor 
hired an attorney and an accountant to assist in preparation of 
the federal estate tax return for the estate. However, neither 
advisor informed the executor about the FOBD available for 
the estate and the return was filed without the FOBD election. 
The IRS granted the estate an extension of time to file an 
amended return with the FOBD election. Ltr. Rul. 200352008, 
Sept. 15, 2003. 
The decedent’s estate included interests in a business and 
the estate’s federal estate tax return made the FOBD election; 
however, Part 5 of Schedule T (Agreement to Family-Owned 
Business Interest Deduction under Section 2057) was not 
included in the return. The IRS examined the return and sent 
a request for additional information. The heirs executed the 
Schedule T agreement within 90 days after receiving the 
request for information. The return examiner denied the FOBD 
election because of the failure to include the Schedule T 
agreement. The IRS ruled that the election was effective 
because the agreement was filed within 90 days after the 
request for information. Ltr. Rul. 200352003, Aug. 25, 2003. 
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS. The IRS has 
adopted as final regulations which provide that the 
administration of a pre-September 25, 1985 trust in 
conformance with a state law that defines income as a unitrust 
amount, or permits equitable adjustments between income and 
principal to ensure impartiality, and that meets the requirements 
of Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-1(a), will not be treated as a 
modification that shifts a beneficial interest to a lower 
generation beneficiary, or increases the amount of a generation-
skipping transfer, subjecting the trust to GSTT. See also infra 
under TRUSTS. 69 Fed. Reg. 12 (Jan. 2, 2004), amending 
Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b). 
TRUSTS. The IRS has adopted as final regulations which 
amend the definition of income under Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)­
1 to take into account certain state statutory changes to the 
concepts of income and principal. Under the final regulations, 
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trust provisions that depart fundamentally from traditional 
concepts of income and principal (that is, allocating ordinary 
income to income and capital gains to principal) will 
generally continue to be disregarded, as they are under the 
current regulations. However, amounts allocated between 
income and principal pursuant to applicable state law will 
be respected if state law provides for a reasonable 
apportionment between the income and remainder 
beneficiaries of the total return of the trust for the year, taking 
into account ordinary income, capital gains, and, in some 
situations, unrealized appreciation. Similarly, a state law that 
permits the trustee to make equitable adjustments between 
income and principal to fulfill the trustee’s duty of 
impartiality between the income and remainder beneficiaries 
is a reasonable apportionment of the total return of the trust. 
In addition, the proposed regulations provide that an 
allocation of capital gains to income will be respected if 
directed by the terms of the governing instrument and 
applicable local law. Similarly, if a trustee, pursuant to a 
discretionary power granted to the trustee by local law or by 
the governing instrument (if not inconsistent with local law), 
allocates capital gains to income, the allocation will be 
respected, provided the power is exercised in a reasonable 
and consistent manner. The changes to the regulations permit 
trustees to implement a total return investment strategy and 
to follow the applicable state statutes designed to treat the 
income and remainder beneficiaries impartially. At the same 
time, the limitations imposed by the regulations ensure that 
the provisions relying on the definition of income under 
I.R.C. § 643(b) are not undermined by an unlimited ability 
of the trustee to allocate between income and principal. 
Under the final regulations, capital gains are included in 
distributable net income under certain circumstances that are 
directed by the terms of the governing instrument and 
applicable local law. Thus, any capital gain that is included 
in the I.R.C. § 643(b) definition of income is included in 
distributable net income. Similarly, any capital gain that is 
used to determine the amount or the timing of a distribution 
to a beneficiary is included in distributable net income. 
Capital gains are also included in distributable net income if 
the fiduciary, pursuant to a discretionary power granted by 
local law or by the governing instrument (if not inconsistent 
with local law), treats the capital gains as distributed to a 
beneficiary, provided the power is exercised in a reasonable 
and consistent manner. Thus, if a trustee exercises a 
discretionary power by consistently treating any distribution 
in excess of ordinary income as being made from realized 
capital gains, any capital gain so distributed is included in 
distributable net income. 69 Fed. Reg. 12 (Jan. 2, 2004), 




ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has issued a revenue 
procedure that provides an automatic consent procedure 
allowing a taxpayer to make a change in method of accounting 
under I.R.C. § 446(e) for depreciable or amortizable property 
after its disposition. The revenue procedure also waives the 
application of the two-year rule set forth in Rev. Rul. 90-38, 
1990-1 CB 57, for certain changes in depreciation or 
amortization. Rev. Proc. 2004-11, I.R.B. 2004-__. 
ANNUITY. The taxpayer transferred partnership interests 
to a previously established trust in exchange for an annual 
annuity. The trust’s beneficiary was the taxpayer’s 
grandchildren. The trust’s principal was primarily in stock 
and real estate holdings. The annuity payments were based 
on the IRS life expectancy tables and the fair market value of 
the partnership interests transferred to the trust. The annuity 
payments would not increase over time. The annuity payments 
were not secured by trust assets. The IRS ruled that the private 
annuity obligation of the trust was excepted from the definition 
of debt instrument and the original issue discount provisions 
of I.R.C. § 1275. Ltr. Rul. 200352001, Sept. 10, 2003. 
DEPRECIATION. The IRS has issued temporary 
regulations which provide guidance for determining whether 
changes in depreciation or amortization will be considered as 
changes in method of accounting. The IRS had issued Rev. 
Proc. 96-31, 1996-1 C.B. 714, which provided that a change 
from not claiming the depreciation or amortization allowable 
to claiming the depreciation or amortization allowable is a 
change in method of accounting for which the consent of the 
IRS is required. In Kurzet v. Comm’r, 222 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 
2000), the court held that a change in recovery period under 
I.R.C. § 168 was a change in accounting method requiring 
IRS consent under Rev. Proc. 96-31. However, the courts in 
Brookshire Brothers Holding, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 
320 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’g, T.C. Memo 2001-150, 
reh’g en banc denied, 65 Fed. Appx. 511 (5th Cir. 2003); 
O’Shaughnessy v. Comm’r, 332 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2003), rev’g 
in part, 2002-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,235 (D. Minn. 2001); 
and Green Forest Manufacturing Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.Memo. 
2003-75, held that a change in classification of property under 
I.R.C. § 168 was not a change of accounting method requiring 
IRS consent. In general, the regulations provide that a change 
in the depreciation method, period of recovery, or convention 
of a depreciable or amortizable asset is a change in method of 
accounting. This change may be the result of, for example, a 
change in the classification of property under I.R.C. § 168(e) 
or a change in computing depreciation from the general 
depreciation system under I.R.C. § 168(a) to the alternative 
depreciation system of I.R.C. § 168(g). Further, a change to 
or from claiming the additional first year depreciation 
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deduction provided by I.R.C. §§ 168(k) or 1400L(b) is a change 
in method of accounting under certain circumstances. The 
regulations clarify that the useful life exception, which has been 
moved from Treas. Reg. §  1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(b) to Treas. Reg. § 
1.446-1T(e)(2)(ii)(d), applies only to property for which the 
depreciation is determined under I.R.C. § 167 (other than under 
I.R.C. §§ 168, 1400I, 1400L). However, a change to or from a 
useful life (or recovery period or amortization period) that is 
specifically assigned by the I.R.C., the regulations, or other 
guidance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin is a change 
in method of accounting. The regulations also provide that a 
change in salvage value to zero for a depreciable or amortizable 
asset for which the salvage value is expressly treated as zero 
under the I.R.C., the regulations, or other guidance published 
in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, is treated as a change in method 
of accounting. Any other change in salvage value is not treated 
as a change in method of accounting. The regulations provide 
that a change in the accounting for depreciable or amortizable 
assets from single asset accounting to multiple asset accounting 
(pooling), or vice versa, or from one type of multiple asset 
accounting (pooling) to a different type of multiple asset 
accounting (pooling) is a change in method of accounting. Also, 
for depreciable or amortizable assets that are mass assets 
accounted for in multiple asset accounts or pools, a change in 
the method of identifying which assets have been disposed is a 
change in method of accounting (for example, from specific 
identification to a first-in, first-out method). Finally, the 
regulations provide that a change in the treatment of an asset 
from nondepreciable or nonamortizable (nondepreciable) to 
depreciable or amortizable (depreciable), or vice versa, is a 
change in method of accounting. With respect to a change from 
the 200-percent or 150-percent declining balance method under 
I.R.C. § 168(b)(1) or (2) to the straight line method, the 
regulations provide that this change may be made without the 
consent of the Commissioner in the first taxable year in which 
the depreciation allowance under the straight line method is 
greater than the depreciation allowance under the declining 
balance method. 69 Fed. Reg. 5 (Jan. 2, 2004). 
HEDGING. The taxpayer entered into a hedge, as defined 
by I.R.C. § 1221(b)(2)(A) and Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(b), to 
minimize the risk on the interest rate from a loan but did not 
identify the transaction as a hedge as provided under Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1221-2(f). In addition, the taxpayer did not comply with the 
identification requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(d)(2). The 
taxpayer’s method of accounting for the hedge was not a 
permissable method under Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4. The IRS ruled 
that the taxpayer’s failure to correctly identify the transaction 
as a hedge did not excuse the taxpayer from using a permissable 
accounting method. In addition, if the taxpayer is using an 
impermissable accounting method for the hedge, the taxpayer 
is required to obtain IRS consent to change to a permissable 
method. Rev. Rul. 2003-127, I.R.B. 2003-__. 
LETTER RULINGS. The IRS has issued its annual list of 
procedures for issuing letter rulings. Rev. Proc. 2004-1, I.R.B. 
2004-1, 1. 
The IRS has issued its annual list of procedures for furnishing 
technical advice to District Directors and Chiefs, Appeals 
Offices. Rev. Proc. 2004-2, I.R.B. 2004-1, 83. 
The IRS has issued its annual list of tax issues for which the 
IRS will not give advance rulings or determination letters. Rev. 
Proc. 2004-3, I.R.B. 2004-1, 114. 
The IRS has issued a revenue procedure which provides 
guidance for complying with the user fee program of the Internal 
Revenue Service as it pertains to requests for letter rulings, 
determination letters, etc., on matters under the jurisdiction of 
the Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Government Entities 
Division; and requests for administrative scrutiny 
determinations under Rev. Proc. 93-41, 1993-2 C.B. 536. Rev. 
Proc. 2004-8, I.R.B. 2004-1, 240. 
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in January 2004, 
the weighted average is 5.25 percent with the permissible range 
of 4.72 to 5.51 percent (90 to 120 percent permissible range) 
and 4.72 to 5.77 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible range) 
for purposes of determining the full funding limitation under 
I.R.C. § 412(c)(7). Notice 2004-3, I.R.B. 2004-__. 
NEGLIGENCE 
DUTY. The plaintiff’s decedent was killed while trying to 
clean out a silo. The decedent operated a farm with the 
defendant, the decedent’s father, under several partnerships, 
although the farm was owned by the defendant. The testimony 
demonstrated that the decedent was aware of the dangers of 
entering a silo with corn inside. The trial court granted 
summary judgment to the defendant because the defendant 
did not owe any duty to the decedent. The plaintiff presented 
several theories of the duty owed by the defendant to the 
decedent: (1) the duty of an employer to an employee; (2) the 
duty of a lessor to a lessee; and (3) the duty of a landowner to 
an entrant. The court held that the decedent was not an 
employee of the defendant because the farm was operated as a 
partnership. The court also held that the defendant did not owe 
a duty as landlord because the condition of the silo arose after 
the relationship (the court does not refer to the relationship as 
a lease) began and the parties did not agree to make the 
defendant responsible for all repairs. The court ruled that the 
defendant did not owe a duty to the decedent as an entrant on 
the property because the decedent was a lawful entrant as an 
owner of the business. The plaintiff also argued that the 
decedent did not assume any risk in cleaning out the silo. The 
court noted that the assumption of risk doctrine was no longer 
an affirmative defence to negligence in North Dakota but was 
only a factor for comparative fault. However, the court held 
that the decedent was well aware of the dangers of entering a 
silo containing corn and that the defendant did not have a duty 
to warn the decedent about attempting to clean the interior of 
the silo. Iglehart v. Iglehart, 670 N.W.2d 343 (N.D. 2003). 
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
PREPAID FEED. The plaintiffs were dairies which had made 
year-end prepayments for feed to be supplied by the debtor over 
the next year. The plaintiffs had taken the prepayments as feed 
deductions on their federal and state income tax returns. The 
debtor had granted a security interest in all assets to a creditor. 
When the debtor’s financial condition deteriorated, the creditor 
obtained the prepayment funds as part of a buydown of the loan. 
The plaintiffs argued that the prepayment funds were held in 
trust by the debtor and were not subject to the security interest 
of the creditor. The court held that the prepayment funds were 
not held in trust for the plaintiffs because the funds were not 
held in a separate account and were not held under a trust or 
other agreement which restricted the debtor’s use of the funds. 
Weststeyn Dairy v. Eades Commodities Co., 280 F. Supp.2d 
1044 (E.D. Calif. 2003). 
PRIORITY. The debtor purchased and fed cattle. The cattle 
were usually quickly sold to customers but left at the feedlot 
until the cattle reached market weight. The debtor provided feed 
and other care. The debtor had granted a security interest in all 
livestock, offspring and all cattle feed to a bank. The debtor had 
purchased one lot of cattle using funds obtained from the bank 
loan. A portion of that lot of cattle was sold to a creditor who 
paid with a check made out solely to the debtor, although the 
bank had required all checks for cattle to be made jointly to the 
bank and debtor. The buyer did not file any security interest 
with the Nebraska central filing system. The payment check 
funds were not traced to any payment on the loan amount; 
therefore, the court held that the bank’s attempt to enforce its 
security interest in the cattle would not amount to a double 
recovery. A corn farmer provided feed corn to the debtor which 
was paid for by the cattle purchaser. The corn was delivered 
under an agreement that the price paid would be determined at 
a later date. The corn was commingled by the debtor with other 
feed corn in inventory and was not segregated for use in feeding 
the purchaser’s cattle.  The farmer did not file or otherwise give 
notice of any security interest in the corn delivered to the debtor, 
either on the farmer’s or the cattle purchaser’s behalf. Although 
the debtor treated the corn as the debtor’s property on statements 
to the bank, the debtor treated the corn as an offset against 
amounts owed by the cattle purchaser for the debtor’s care of 
the cattle. The court held that the bank held a valid security 
interest in the cattle because the debtor had rights in the cattle 
when first purchased and the security interest was properly 
perfected. Because the cattle purchaser failed to perfect any lien 
on the cattle, the purchaser took the interest in the cattle subject 
to the bank’s security interest. As to the feed corn, the court 
held that the farmer did not retain any title to the corn merely 
because the price was to be determined later. In addition, even 
without passage of title to the debtor, the delivery of the corn 
transferred sufficient rights to the debtor for the bank’s security 
interest to attach to the corn. In re Damrow Cattle Co., Inc., 
300 B.R. 479 (Bankr. D, Neb. 2003). 
PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY INTEREST. The 
debtors were brothers who operated a farm as a partnership. One 
debtor granted a security interest to a bank in all cattle and after-
acquired cattle owned by the debtors to secure a loan from the 
bank. After the bank perfected its security interest, the debtors 
purchased 54 cows from another creditor in exchange for a 
promissory note and security agreement. The seller filed a 
financing statement prior to the debtors filing for bankruptcy. 
The seller, however, did not send a notice of the claimed security 
interest to the bank, as required by N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-324(d). The 
seller claimed that its security interest had priority over the bank’s 
security interest as a purchase-money security interest. The court 
held that the failure of the seller to send written notification of 
the security interest to the bank prevented the seller from claiming 
priority over the bank’s prior-perfected security interest. Zink 
v. Vanmiddlesworth, 300 B.R. 394 (N.D. N.Y. 2003). 
STATE REGULATION OF 
AGRICULTURE 
MILK. The plaintiffs were certified organic milk processors 
subject to the Gonsalves Milk Pooling Act which reallocated 
money among milk processors to stabilize production and prices 
of milk used for fluid milk products. The plaintiffs claimed that 
the pooling system treated organic milk processors unfairly 
because the amounts required to be paid into the pool were less 
than the amounts received from the pool since organic producers 
demanded higher prices for their products. The plaintiffs argued 
that the unfairness made the pooling system unconstitutional. 
The court held that the pooling system was constitutional in that 
it served a rational state purpose of stabilizing retail market prices 
and product availability. The court held that the separation of 
organic milk from the pooling system would destabilize the 
market and prevent the purpose of the pooling system. The court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that organic milk was 
significantly different from regular milk to make the pooling 
plan irrational. The court also noted that, although the current 
pool price for processors was less than the cost of processing, 
the pooling system provided a safety net of a minimum price 
which prevented the price from dropping further. Strass Family 
Creamery v. Lyons, 280 F. Supp.2d 1028 (N.D. Calif. 2003). 
CITATION UPDATES 
Bot v. Comm’r, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,112 (8th 
Cir. 2003), aff’g, 118 T.C. 138 (2002) (self-employment income) 
see p. 7 supra. 
Michigan Pork Producers v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157(6th 
Cir. 2003) ,aff’g, 229 F. Supp.2d 772 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (pork 
check-off) see Vol. 14 Agric. L. Dig. 163. 
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reader software, including Adobe Acrobat, Adobe Acrobat Reader, and Adobe 
Acrobat Approval. With most PDF readers, the file can be searched, copied and 
printed. The file can be quickly forwarded through your internal e-mail network to 
each member of your firm. 
To receive your free sample e-mail issue, just send an e-mail to 
robert@agrilawpress.com requesting a copy. If you find the issue more convenient, 
more timely, and less costly than your print issue, just let us know and we will 
change your subscription immediately. 
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